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Abstract Previous work in Game Studies has centered on several loci of
investigation in seeking to understand virtual gameworlds. First, researchers
have scrutinized the concept of the virtual world itself and how it relates to
the idea of “the magic circle.” Second, the field has outlined various forms
of experienced “presence.” Third, scholarship has noted that the boundaries
between the world of everyday life and virtual worlds are porous, and that this
fosters a multiplicity of identities as players identify both with themselves-
oﬄine and themselves-in-game. Despite widespread agreement that these
topics are targets for research, so far those working on these topics do not
have a mutually agreed-upon framework. Here we draw upon the work of
Alfred Schutz to take up this call. We provide a phenomenological framework
which can be used to describe the phenomena of interest to Game Studies,
as well as open new avenues of inquiry, in a way acceptable and useful to
all. This helps to distinguish the core of the field from the supplemental
theoretical and critical commitments which characterize diverse approaches
within the field.
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“It is said that a certain man in Abydos being deranged in mind, and going
to the theatre on many days looked on (as though actors were performing a
play), and applauded; and, when he was restored to his senses, he declared
that that was the happiest time he had ever spent.”
— Aristotle, On Marvelous Things Heard
Introduction
Video games enable users to step into the “magic circle” that defines the
playground of a virtual world (Castronova, 2008; Huizinga, 1950; Nardi, 2010;
Salen & Zimmerman, 2004). Users experience their own “presence” in that
world, and the “co-presence” of others – often as virtually embodied presences
via avatars (Schroeder, 2002; Hardesty, 2016). Research has shown that the
boundary between worlds is permeable, and our ability to extend ourselves
into online gameworlds presents challenges for understanding our own identi-
ties (Pearce & Artemesia, 2008; Taylor, 1999; Turkle, 2012). Since identity is
(at least partially) socially co-constructed and intertwined with place, living
across multiple worlds can create a multiplicity of identity (Nitsche, 2008;
Pearce & Artemesia, 2007).
The foregoing claims represent much of the current landscape of Game
Studies on multiplayer online video games.1 For the sake of brevity, and
although we focus only on a subset of the broader literature on games and
only on some kinds of video games, we will call this literature “Game Stud-
ies” (GS). We do so to demarcate it from the other body of literature with
which we engage: phenomenology. As indicated (and as discussed further
in the section “Brief Survey of Game Studies” below), researchers in Game
Studies have identified and isolated a variety of topics as targets of inquiry.
Researchers have approached these topics from their preferred theoretical
orientation. In part because of the lack of a shared conceptual framework,
GS has become somewhat fractured regarding these topics. While the work
which has been accomplished is significant, we contend that the literature
1This indicates the scope of our aims here. We will not be addressing: 1) all games (in-
cluding physical/tabletop games); 2) strictly single-player games; 3) virtual worlds which
are not game spaces. Our focus is on online games that involve multiple players interacting
with each other. Examples of these kinds of games, as we will discuss, are MMOs (massive
multiplayer online games), MMORPGs (massive multiplayer online role-playing games),
MMOAGs (massive multiplayer online adventure games), multiplayer RTS’s (real-time
strategy games), and MOBAs (multiplayer online battle arenas).
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has yet to provide a full account of phenomena central to the experience of
playing video games. One phenomenon of particular interest, which we will
explore in this paper, is how players in online multiplayer games (particu-
larly games involving 3D avatars) experience each other as other subjects
and how they could possibly have the rich and authentic social relationships
they claim to have.2
In this paper, we offer a basic re-unification of prior research on this topic
by extending Alfred Schutz’s (1967) phenomenological conception of social-
ity to understand players’ experience of being together in digitally-mediated
video gameworlds.3 We maintain that a parsimonious and theory-neutral
unification of phenomena that have been prominent targets of research in
GS can be gained by recognizing that virtual worlds support novel forms of
what Schutz calls4 “face-to-face” encounters between consociates, or novel
forms of being together with others. He also calls this a concrete “We-
relationship,”but we privilage the term “face-to-face” to emphasize the di-
rect, interpersonal character of the relationship (Schutz, 1967, p.167). We
maintain that it is the possibility of “face-to-face” interactions in and across
worlds, virtual or not, that enables and reveals the multiplicities of identity
that have served as a focal point of much recent research in GS. In these
interactions, participants are aware of each other’s presence and also aware
that the other is reciprocally aware of them. What is crucial, in our view, is
that the basic phenomenal experience of the ‘face-to-face” relationship that
Schutz describes does not require proximity in the space of the everyday life-
world, and can (and does) occur in virtual spaces. To mark this distinction
between a commonsense conception of a “face-to-face” relationship (which
2See Taylor (2002, p.54) and Pearce & Artemesia (2008, p.7) for examples of players
reporting their experiences of feeling socially connected and “together.”
3Zhao has similarly pursued an extension of Schutzian phenomenology to cyberspace
(2004, p.92). However, our framework does not invoke Zhao’s concept of “telecopresence”
(ibid., p.98) or of a “face to device” interaction (ibid., p.99), since we rather focus on how
we can encounter others face-to-face* in a digital environment.
4Note that no literal German equivalent of the term “face to face” is centrally employed
in the original text of Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt. Following on Schutz’ use
of the English term “face-to-face” in later work, this phrase became the preferred English
translation for phrases like “der umweltlichen sozialen Beziehung” and “die umweltliche
Situation” – phrases far less likely to invoke commonsense conceptions of everyday bodily
proximity. Schutz always emphasized that the core phenomenological features of what
he called a “face-to-face” relationship were only a community of space and time during
interaction (see, e.g., Schutz’ “Making music together,” reprinted in 1962, p.172, fn.19).
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does, we admit, involve everyday bodily proximity), and the more fundamen-
tal relationship which is targeted in Schutz’ phenomenological analysis, we
refer to the latter using the technical term “face-to-face*” relationship. We
contend that an intuitive or “commonsense” understanding of a face-to-face
relationship is already abandoned in Schutz’ phenomenological description:
for him (and for us) it is a technical term used with a specific meaning, to
thematize aspects of social experience that are quite commonly overlooked.5
We will discuss the face-to-face* relationship further in the section “Schutz’
Phenomenological Approach” below. However, it is worth clarifying the way
we are using this term early on. To call an interaction a face-to-face* or con-
crete We-relationship is to pick out the “We-ness” or “being-together” aspect
of a living social interaction, beyond whatever else may occur between those
individuals. This being-together is the essential structural component of
the experienced relation. The particularities of a face-to-face* encounter do
matter, and they can be analyzed for how they enrich the dynamic struc-
ture of two subjects being together. For example, the specific visual, tactile,
or olfactory sensations one has in close, everyday bodily interaction might
inform one’s experience of the other. These are some ways the structure
of a direct social relationship can be “concretized... and filled with content
[inhaltserfu¨llte]” (ibid., p.164).6 Schutz sometimes describes these particular-
ities as a “fullness of indications” [Symptomefu¨lle]” which express the other’s
conscious life. However, there is no special set of particularities which are
necessary for a face-to-face* relationship, instead a wide variety of particular-
ities may be sufficient for it. What is required for a face-to-face* relationship,
according to Schutz, is that each be reciprocally aware of another, and that
each partner have “specific knowledge [besonderes Wissen] of the specific
manner [besonderen Sosein] in which he is being regarded by the other part-
5Cf. Schutz (1967) §34. Generally, while phenomenology seeks to analyze everyday
experience, this does not mean that its analyses traffic in the everyday or commonsense
meaning of terms and concepts. Caution is often required to avoid invoking the (of-
ten ambiguous) na¨ıve or commonsense meaning of terms employed in phenomenological
descriptions (cf. Husserl 2014, e.g., the final sentence of §33, or Schutz 1967, §21-22). Like-
wise, while in everyday conversation “face-to-face” refers to physical bodily co-presence,
in phenomenological analysis, it is possible and necessary to disentangle the notion of
everyday bodily proximity from the experience of “being together.”
6Walsh and Lehnert’s English translation of Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt
(“The Phenomenology of the Social World”) has been aptly described as “unfortunately
very unreliable” (Evans, 1989, p.326, fn.12). Here we limit our English quotations to the
acceptable portions, and provide the original German for any key phrases.
Hardesty
& Sheredos
Being Together, Worlds Apart
Cite only the version published in Human Studies (4/35)
ner” – whatever the specifics may be in each case (ibid., p.168). What is
important is that some such specifics are available, and that in ongoing in-
teraction, the other is present (gegenwa¨rtig) to me, here and now, in some
richly expressive way (ibid., p.169).
Although Schutz did not have interactions via video games in mind, we
maintain that his account allows for this kind of rich togetherness to occur
through interactions in video gameworlds, as long as the gameworlds afford
the player the opportunity to have reciprocal awareness of others and make
themselves appear as conscious subjects (and not merely as in-game objects).
As in the everyday case, there is no special requirement for any specific kind
of sensory experience: many varieties may suffice. The important result
for GS is a better understanding of virtual sociality, and a re-unification of
research topics. The important phenomenological result is the recognition
that some video games afford us access to genuine, social life-worlds beyond
the everyday life-world.
Some influential scholars, such as Sherry Turkle, have implicitly resisted
the conceptual move we promote here. Drawing contrasts with her work will
enable us to concisely frame our view and clarify our aims. Turkle expresses
concern about “how we are changed as technology offers us substitutes for
connecting with each other face-to-face” (2012, p.11, our emph.). In more
recent work she has continued to argue that “when we have [e.g.] our mo-
bile devices with us, we see that we turn away from our children, romantic
partners, and work colleagues” – this same claim is extended to computer
software, social media in general, and virtual spaces (Turkle, 2012, p.29).
She regards our engagements with others via a variety of technologies as a
“flight from conversation” that affords only superficial or in some way dimin-
ished relationships. Conversely, we maintain that, from a phenomenological
perspective, some technology should be understood as offering us new ways
of connecting with each other, face-to-face*, even when we are physically
apart. Unlike Turkle, our primary aim here is not to discuss or safeguard
“the value we put on [commonsense] face-to-face human connection” (ibid.,
p.284). However, our claims do have relevance to evaluative projects such as
Turkle’s. If one supposes that face-to-face* encounters only occur in through
bodily proximity in the everyday life-world, then it is natural to follow Turkle
in supposing that any value we place on being together will assign primary
importance to our interactions in the everyday life-world, and thus to worry
that new technologies risk “disrupt[ing] our attachments to things that have
always sustained us,” namely everyday social interactions (ibid., p.284). This
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is Turkle’s route: when we fail to socially engage each other in bodily proxim-
ity in the everyday life-world, choosing instead to engage with and through
technology, she claims we fail to participate in any face-to-face* relation-
ship whatsoever, and pass up valuable social interaction. We end up Alone
Together (the title of her book) in the everyday life-world:
“A ‘place’ used to comprise a physical space and the people within
it. What is a place if those who are physically present have their
attention on the [physically] absent? At a cafe´ a block from my
home, almost everyone is on a computer or smartphone as they
drink their coffee. These people are not my friends, yet somehow
I miss their presence” (2012, pp.155-156).
The primacy accorded here to our experience of sociality in the everyday
life-world has force so long as we think it is the only place where we can be
together. Yet we maintain that an adequate framework that accommodates
the bulk of research in GS requires us to put life in virtual worlds on equal
phenomenological footing: a virtual place can just as well be a place for being
together, a place for genuine face-to-face* encounters. Still, we want to do
justice to Turkle’s core phenomenological observation: when someone lives
into a virtual world and we do not join them, they are not being together in
the everyday life-world with us. However, this raises the questions: “where
are they in those moments? And if they are not with us, who are they with?
They are being together with others, but worlds apart from us. Our primary
aim in providing an extension of Schutz’s framework is to offer a common
set of phenomenological tools that will enable researchers to adequately de-
scribe increasingly prevalent situations like these. Additionally, we intend
for this framework to be capable of analyzing, and capturing, the richness
and intimacy of interactions that players report in multiplayer gameworlds.
We admit that our focus on GS here is narrower than Turkle’s and we
cannot aim to provide a fully-adequate response to all instances of sociality
afforded by, or mediated through, technology. Turkle’s work encompasses
people’s engagement with social robots and electronic toys, as well as dig-
itally “networked life” in many forms (including multiplayer online games,
simulations, and social networks such as Facebook). Overzealous engagement
with all these technologies can, in her view, risk alienating us from each other
– as seen in the case of smartphones in cafe´s discussed above. We make no
claim that our extension of Schutz preserves the possibility of face-to-face*
encounters in virtual places in all these cases: but we do seek to preserve
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it in the case of multiplayer online gameworlds. Exploring how one might
generalize this framework to other cases is a task for future work.
The paper proceeds as follows. First (“Brief Survey of Game Studies
Research”) we provide a more detailed introduction to recent Game Stud-
ies, identifying several popular loci of investigation. Second (“Schutz’ Phe-
nomenological Approach”) we provide an introduction to Schutz’s nuanced
phenomenology of the social world. We then (“Extension and Application”)
show how the Schutzian account can be extended to sociality in virtual
worlds, and how it provides a robust framework for future GS by addressing
all the loci of investigation. Finally (“Concluding Remarks”) we summa-
rize the virtues of the Schutzian framework, and raw some conclusions for
phenomenology.
1 Brief Survey of Game Studies Research
Canvassing the recent literature in Game Studies (“GS”), we find three
broadly distinct, yet related, loci of investigation. Here we briefly discuss
each in turn: “the magic circle,” in-game “presence,” and the basic notion
of virtual “worlds” as such.
1.1 The “Magic Circle”
In his analysis of “play,” Johan Huizinga (1950) proposed to distinguish
the time and space in which play occurs from the time and space of the
everyday life-world. Frequently, GS texts have cited Huizinga to discuss
the unique spatiality of games. Commentators have latched onto the term
“magic circle”as the generic concept here, though in Huizinga’s sketch it
appears as only one example among many. The more general notion is that
of a playground, a “temporary world” in which all play occurs, and which
is “marked off beforehand either materially or ideally, deliberately or as a
matter of course” (Huizinga, 1950, p.10).
For Huizinga, the world of play is distinct from the everyday life-world:
the “rules” of play temporarily transform everyday space into a space that is
charged with new meaning. He compares play to a sacred rite, in which “the
participants... are convinced that the action actualizes and effects a definite
beatification, brings about an order of things higher than that in which they
customarily live” (ibid., p.14). It is not surprising that GS has appropriated
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the notion of the magic circle to characterize virtual gameworlds, which are
somehow accessible from the everyday life-world, and yet simultaneously ex-
hibit their own spatiotemporality, their own “rules” of play, and their own
meanings and values (see, e.g, Pearce & Artemesia (2007). Importantly,
however, GS has revealed that the boundaries of the “magic circles” which
demarcate today’s virtual worlds appear to be highly permeable (Taylor 2002,
pp.51ff; Castronova 2008, pp.147ff.; Boellstorff 2006, pp.119ff; Nardi 2010,
pp.118-120).
Most centrally, the permeability of the magic circle has been linked to
issues of users’ experienced identity and selfhood – topics that will re-appear
in the sub-section on “presence” below. Users explore themselves in virtual
worlds, and typically take at least part of their “virtual” identities with
them when they leave a virtual world. Some express that they feel more at
home in virtual worlds than they do in the everyday life-world, and regard
their virtual activities as the true expression of themselves. An early, yet
representative example is provided by T.L. Taylor, who interviewed a user
of a 2D, avatar-based game called The Dreamscape. The user reported: “I
identify this brown cat as me more than I identify my [‘real’] picture with
me... I can’t see ‘me’ in the WW [‘waking world’] but I can see ‘me in
the DS [Dreamscape]” (Taylor, 2002, p.54; first insertion is ours). For these
users, Huizinga’s sketch of the temporary nature of playgrounds may seem
to have it backwards: it is everyday life which is an unwelcome interruption
of life within the virtual world. The importance of this issue only increases
when one notes that some users maintain a single experienced identity across
multiple virtual worlds (what Pearce & Artemesia 2008 dubbed a “trans-
ludic” identity). This shows that the boundaries between virtual worlds are
also permeable.
Importantly, while a variety of different theoretical conceptions of identity
are potentially applicable here, our phenomenological orientation is necessar-
ily neutral about particular kinds of identity (e.g. personal, social, collective).
While a phenomenological framework could give an account of how these are
experienced, the framework itself has no interest in the reality or validity of
these types, nor is a phenomenological framework beholden to any theory
of identity developed elsewhere. To the extent that a “trans-ludic” iden-
tity is experienced as stable across multiple virtual worlds (and especially
to the extent that it forms a unity with “oﬄine” identity in the everyday
life-world), one might seek to understand identity on the classical model of a
metaphysically independent substance. To the extent that experienced iden-
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tity becomes truly multiple as it is shaped by social interaction in diverse
virtual worlds (see our remarks on “presence” below), one might rather seek
to understand identities as socially-constructed entities or relationships. For
our purposes, what is important are only the diverse manners in which iden-
tity is experienced by users: we make no claims about any further reality
that identity or self may possess. We likewise make no attempt to adjudicate
between the different ways in which users experience themselves: we simply
take all of them as phenomena.
1.2 Presence
A second locus of GS has been the experienced “presence” of players in vir-
tual worlds. In general, the notion of “presence” is focused on the subjective
experience of a user, and refers to “a mental state where a user feels subjec-
tively present within a video game space as the result of immersion” (Nitsche,
2008, p.203). Many varieties of presence have been distinguished (see Lom-
bard & Ditton 1997), but we here confine ourselves to Nitsche’s basic three:
1) felt “personal presence” of the user in the gameworld; 2) “social pres-
ence,” or the user’s feeling of co-presence with others in a shared (virtual)
space and time; 3) “environmental presence,” or the presence of the world to
the user as persistent and durable.7 We take these varieties of presence to be
phenomena, of which there are many theoretical analyses. We showcase some
of the diverse theoretical perspectives that have been taken towards all three
varieties of presence. While some theoretical perspectives can be read as
analyzing only one variety of presence in isolation, we underscore that many
theoreticians agree that several varieties of presence should be understood
in relation to each other. We highlight how some theoretical perspectives
fail to provide a fully-unified treatment of the varieties of presence – thereby
clarifying the significance of our Schutzian perspective’s ability to unify them
successfully.
Perhaps the most limited approach to presence (at least on one reading)
is a performance-theoretic view, according to which, to experience presence
is to “step into a dramatic role in relation to the game space,” which requires
that the user be positioned as “a creative performing element inside the spa-
tially located discourse” of the game (Nitsche 2008, p.212; see also Bernie
7Carrie Heeter (1992) originally used these categories to describe presence in virtual
worlds in general, not specifically video games.
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De Koven’s conception of “play communities”). The performance-theoretic
approach is most readily understood as targeting personal presence, though
there are hints toward co-presence (e.g., in Nitsche’s appeal to a “discourse”)
and to environmental presence (e.g., in Nitsche’s appeal to a discourse which
is “spatially located”). The phenomenological difficulty for a general appli-
cation of the performance-theoretic approach is that it conflicts with the fact
that some users do not experience their in-game-presence, or that of others,
as mere role-playing, and do not experience their encounters in the virtual
world as a set piece. (See again the quote from Taylor offered in the pre-
vious section). These users identify with their in-game representations as
themselves, or extensions thereof — not simply as dramatis personae — and
similarly experience the others they encounter as living in a virtual world.
Correspondingly, for them, the virtual world may be equally, if not more,
“real” than the everyday life-world. Counter to an intuitive reading of the
performance-theoretic view, players’ experiences suggest that environmental
presence, personal presence, and co-presence arise through more than partic-
ipation in a drama which is “put on,” and instead involve an engagement in
which both identity and world are lived as actual.
Other analyses link presence more closely with experienced identity and
self-hood (not with a “mere” role). In Taylor’s analysis of The Dreamscape,
a user establishes his or her in-game identity in virtue of being digitally
embodied via an avatar, and achieves presence through the visibility of the
avatar (Taylor, 2002, see esp. pp.42 & 44). Taylor’s analysis emphasizes the
co-production of both a player’s presence alongside social co-presence with
others. For example, players customize their avatars’ appearances to signify
group-membership, simultaneously enacting personal presence and signaling
their social status in the co-presence of others. (ibid., pp.45-47). Because
personal presence relies on visibility on this view, the visible proximity of
one’s avatar to another can signify intimacy, and the act of occluding an-
other player’s avatar with one’s own is sometimes considered an aggressive
invasion of personal space (ibid., pp.42-43). However, in Taylor’s description,
environmental presence has a rather static quality – the gameworld is largely
treated as the constant backdrop against which players achieve both personal
and co-presence
Alternatively, Pearce & Artemesia view the role of “world” as being inti-
mately linked with identity and presence.8 In her studies, users of the game
8Pearce notably co-authors her work on the Uru with her in-game identity/avatar
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Uru: Ages Beyond Myst collaboratively developed a “fictive ethnicity” which
tied their in-game identity to a specific, virtual locality: the users identified
as natives to their virtual home-world, calling themselves the Uru people or
“Uruvians” (Pearce & Artemesia, 2008). However, Pearce also demonstrates
that such identities can be “trans-ludic.” In her case, a group socially con-
structed their identity in one virtual world: the gameworld of Uru. When the
servers for Uru were shut down and that homeworld was lost, the Uruvians
regarded themselves as “refugees,” and they carefully planned migrations to
other virtual worlds. They brought their Uruvian-refugee identity with them
to many other virtual worlds, collectively maintaining the group identity
and even replicating its (virtual-)material culture in a new locality. This is
a striking example of the way in which social, personal, and environmental
presence can be experienced as co-constructed in virtual worlds.
We note, however, that (like the performance-theoretic appeal to “roles”)
calling such in-game ethnicities “fictive” risks deforming the phenomeno-
logical import of players’ experiences. We take it that the true puzzle of
understanding the permeability of the magic circle is not to understand how
players pretend to be Uru, but rather to understand how they genuinely expe-
rience themselves as Uru. As one of Pearce & Artemesia’s subjects put it, in
a poem written after the Uru server shut-down: “This is no longer a game to
me / These people are part of my family” (Pearce & Artemesia, 2009, p.209).
For this reason, we would modulate Pearce & Artemesia’s claim, saying sim-
ply that Uru players have an experienced ethnicity : their personal presence
is informed by environmental and social co-presence insofar as they experi-
ence themselves as members of a community that is genealogically linked to
a specific (virtual) locality.9
We maintain that Pearce & Artemesia’s account offers a hint at a phe-
nomenologically adequate conception of how players experience the related-
ness of personal, environmental, and social presence, and their co-construction.
To generalize the account, it is important to see that even when a virtual
locality is not quite so robustly connected to player identity as to constitute
an experienced ethnicity, in Pearce & Artemesia’s sense, it still informs and
constrains a user’s in-game identity. Players experience themselves as, we
shall say, denizens of a given virtual world, whether or not this aspect of
“Artemesia.”
9We do not presume that such aspects identity-in-relation-to-a-place are the only, or
even the most important aspects of ethnicity in the everyday life-world. The reader is free
to fill in “ethnicity*” if they prefer.
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virtual identity is experienced as tying them to one virtual locality within a
given world. This aspect of virtual identity is often left implicit rather than
thematized by denizens.
1.3 Worldness
This brings us to the third and final locus of GS research: the notion of
a virtual world itself. As the foregoing discussions of presence help to in-
dicate, there are a number of diverse conceptions of virtual worlds. It is
generally granted that something must occur in order for a world to appear
for a user, or in order for environmental presence to be achieved. A general
characterization of experienced virtual worlds, which most researchers would
probably agree on, emphasizes four features: they (i) have “worldness” (they
are object-laden sites of action); (ii) are social (i.e., they afford co-presence);
(iii) are stable or persistent (i.e., they consistently afford environmental pres-
ence); and (iv) are open to users (i.e., they afford users’ personal presence,
and we are able us to step into the “magic circle” that defines the boundary
of the world) (Boellstorff et al., 2012, p.7). We have already shown that there
are disparate theoretical analyses of points (ii—iv): the result is that beyond
the generalities canvassed here, there is likewise little agreement regarding
how best to understand the notion of a virtual gameworld.
In what follows, we offer a Schutzian, phenomenological framework for
understanding experienced life in virtual gameworlds, as we have just char-
acterized it.10 We maintain that this Schutzian view preserves the targets
of past research, unites and relates them in a more substantive manner, and
offers a starting point for further work by sketching out future avenues of
inquiry.
2 Schutz’s Phenomenological Approach
Schutz (1967) drew upon Bergson and Husserl to provide philosophical foun-
dations for sociological research. It remained Schutz’ lifelong goal to articu-
late the structure of our experienced life-world (cf. the posthumous volumes
10We do not claim that all video games must be understood as offering just such a
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Schutz 1962, 1964). Schutz’ most basic aim was to provide a phenomeno-
logical description of the experienced social reality that any social science
undertakes to study. This is our focus here: we are interested in Schutz’
“worldly phenomenology” (contrasted with the more philosophically ambi-
tious “transcendental” phenomenology of Husserl – cf. Embree 1980; Psathas
1980).
What Schutz owes to Husserl is the clarification of the everyday life-
world in terms of the “general thesis of the natural attitude” (Husserl, 2014,
§30).11 In everyday life we presume the actuality of the world and of things
in it (including other persons). The general implicit “thesis” which guides
all our activities – and which we would typically not consider bothering to
make explicit – is the thesis that the world exists. The term “life-world” is a
way of thematizing the world as it is taken-for-granted in our na¨ıve, natural
experience. Schutz surpasses Husserl in thematizing sociality as a pervasive
aspect of the everyday life-world, by distinguishing the “general thesis of
the alter ego” (Schutz, 1967, pp.97ff). This general implicit “thesis” which
guides all our social activities with others is summed up as: “The Thou (or
other person) is conscious, and [their] stream of consciousness is temporal
in character, exhibiting the same basic form as mine” (ibid., p.98). This
is a pervasive feature of our na¨ıve experience of the world: we are in it
with others. In this section we follow Schutz in distinguishing four different
spheres of social reality, or four different kinds of experienced others, which
correspond to four further specifications of the general thesis of the alter ego.
The (implicit) general thesis of the alter ego is that we are in the world
with others. We do not experience everything in the world as a subject:
inanimate objects are not typically experienced in this way. Likewise, we
may not always regard other subjects as such, if we experience them only as
a body, an object, or even a tool for our own ends. Whenever we go beyond
the general thesis of the alter ego, and experience an other subject as a
concrete reality, we are taking up a specific attitude that Schutz calls other-
orientation (Fremdeinstellung). We have “conscious experiences directed
toward the other self” and experience “the other as other,” as an animate
subject (ibid., p.144). Other-orientation is the na¨ıve (implicit) positing of
the actual existence of concrete subjects (ibid., p.146).
11Husserl would not explicitly articulate the notion of the “life-world” itself until later,
but intended it to tie back to the general thesis of the natural attitude in the way we have
sketched here (cf. Husserl 1970).
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Not all others are experienced alike. For example, one posits the concrete,
but not specifically personalistic, existence of an other when one recognizes
that someone has left a note or package at one’s door. This provides an ex-
ample of one form of Other-orientation that Schutz calls “They-orientation”
(Ihr-Einstellung), and the others toward whom one is They-oriented are
called one’s contemporaries (ibid., p.183). In They-orientation, the other
remains somewhat anonymous, and is experienced only as “typical” (ibid.,
cf. 183-186). They-orientation is not fully-informed by engagement with any
particular person; instead one’s prior experiences of how people act and “are”
becomes a “stock of knowledge,” and one presumptively draws upon this to
imagine “types” of people and predict how people of that type would act
(ibid., 80). These “contemporaries” make up one sphere of social reality: the
relatively anonymous mass with-whom one shares a social world (socialien
Mitwelt).
This is distinguished from another form of Other-orientation, called “Thou-
orientation” (Du-Einstellung) (ibid., p.183). We enact Thou-orientation when-
ever we experience an other as a concrete and unique individual with their
own flow of consciousness: here our prior presumptions regarding “a person
of such-and-such type” may be palpably challenged, and discarded. When
two subjects are reciprocally Thou-oriented, they enter a concrete “We-
relationship,” whereby they mutually recognize their co-existence, and share
experience of each other as living, expressive individuals (ibid., p.164-165).
Schutz calls these people one’s “consociates” or “fellow-people” (Mitmen-
schen), and they constitute a second sphere of social reality: the sphere of
consociates, or the directly experienced surrounding world of social reality
(sozialen Umwelt).
Schutz also calls the concrete We-relationship a “face-to-face relation-
ship” (ibid., p.164) – recall that we call this a face-to-face* relationship to
distinguish Schutz’ phenomenological description of this structure of social
experience from any commonsense conception of it. The term face-to-face*
highlights two aspects Schutz considered essential to establishing a living
social relationship: temporal simultaneity, and the spatial immediacy of the
other’s presence (ibid., pp.103; 163-164). A paradigmatic face-to-face* en-
counter occurs during joint attention to each other, where each person is
reciprocally trying to understand the other’s experience. Both are aware
that they have the other’s attention, and both adapt their thought and ac-
tion in an effort to understand, and to be understood. The exchange occurs
in real-time, and the space of expressive interaction is immediately shared:
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we stand before each other, and express ourselves in a common lived space
(ibid., p.163-164).12 As Schutz puts it, “in the living intentionality of the di-
rect social relationship, the two partners are face to face, [i.e.] their streams
of consciousness are synchronized and geared into each other, each imme-
diately affects the other...” (ibid., p.162). Our consciousnesses flow along
together, and we “grow older together” in our shared place and through our
shared time (ibid., p.172).
This expressive-spatial immediacy distinguishes consociates from mere
contemporaries. The anonymity of contemporaries, to whom one is They-
oriented, arises because their individuality is not put on display in a shared
space of expressive interaction. One does understand a mere contemporary
as having experiences, but in They-orientation one does so by drawing from
one’s stock of knowledge: contemporaries are regarded as “typical” people
with “typical” experiences, not apprehended in their unique individuality
(ibid., p.184-185).13
The boundary between these two social spheres is fluid and indeterminate:
someone enters into your sphere of consociates – they enter into a face-to-
face* relationship with you – as they approach you and engage in intimate
interaction. Prior to that, though you may be familiar with this person,
they are not presently your consociate, since you are not face-to-face* with
them. When a conversation ends and you part ways, the other (even a dear
friend) gradually ceases to be your current consociate as you cease to share
expressive-spatial immediacy (ibid., p.176-177). It is open to us to approach
contemporaries whom we do not yet know, and Thou-orient towards them
as individuals. If they reciprocate by Thou-orienting themselves to us, and
establish with us a shared space of expressive interaction, we encounter each
other face-to-face* and become consociates. The world of contemporaries is
thus best viewed as an open horizon of possible consociates.
One shares temporal simultaneity with both contemporaries and conso-
ciates. This distinguishes them from the remaining two varieties of others
we experience in the social world: predecessors and successors. The pure
sphere of predecessors (Vorwelt) is composed of people in the past, whose
experiences do not overlap with one’s own, who lived and died prior to one’s
birth (ibid., p.206). What is essential is that a predecessor is someone that “I
12This may appear to be in agreement with Turkle’s (2012) position; but see “Extension
and Application” below.
13Compare Mead’s conception of the “organized, generalized other”(1934, pp.196ff).
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can never set out to influence,” though they may influence us – nothing we
do can affect them, though what they have done may have a lasting influence
on us, and we thus cannot enter into any face-to-face* relation with them
(ibid., p.208). Because of this, one always experiences a predecessor in some
degree of anonymity. However, one can try to gain knowledge of them in
their individuality through records (written, oral, monuments, etc.).
The sphere of successors (Folgewelt) is not fixed and determined like the
sphere of predecessors. Quite the opposite: it is so “completely indeterminate
and indeterminable” that, as Schutz pithily puts it, “our orientation toward
our successors cannot amount to more than this: that we are going to have
some” (ibid., p.214). Although one can speculate about future others (or
even one’s future self) they are unknowable from the present.
Figure 1: A schematic representation of Schutz’ spheres of social reality. The
grey line divides the whole panel into past (upper left), present (grey line) and
future (bottom right). An individual “I” is in the center. Their predecessor(s)
are in the past, and their successor(s) are in the future. Existing simultaneous
with I is a Contemporary (to whom I is only they-oriented, and who appears
accordingly in anonymity). Also simultaneous is a Consociate (with whom I is
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This concludes our overview of Schutz’ phenomenological description of
the social world. The description is intended to be quite general or schematic:
for example, the sphere of “consociates” does not distinguish between antag-
onists, close friends, romantic partners, etc. Supplementary phenomeno-
logical description, achieving greater specificity, is required to distinguish
these important aspects of social reality – the task is to enrich, not replace,
Schutz’ basic phenomenological description of the social world.14 We offer
a schematic visual representation of the Schutzian description of the social
world in Figure 1 above. In what follows, we focus primarily on the sphere
of consociates and the sphere of contemporaries. As we demonstrate in the
next section, applying these concepts to virtual gameworlds requires only a
slight modulation of Schutz’ view.
3 Extension and Application
Having provided an overview of a Schutz; framework, we now propose ex-
tending it to accommodate social reality in and across online multiplayer
gameworlds. Just as Schutz’ phenomenological description of social reality is
prior to any scientific analysis of it, so our intention is to provide a descrip-
tive framework which can be considered neutral with respect to the various
theories (e.g., performance theory) which have been invoked in GS. In the
subection “The Core Extension,” we clarify how we extend Schutz’ account
in a way that remains true to the spirit of his work, and discuss how the
extension connects with the previous loci of games studies. Our account
is intended to be quite general, and the work in this sub-section is mostly
conceptual. However, in the sub-section “Clarification & Application,” we
discuss in greater detail how this extension enables us to address previous
loci of research in GS, and we provide concrete examples to illustrate the
applicability of the framework.
3.1 The Core Extension
Our aim is to take Schutz’ account of the spheres of social reality as they
occur in the everyday life-world, and apply it to parallel spheres of social
14Schutz provided more incisive descriptions of a few more specific kinds of subject we
might experience in the social world, such as “the Homecomer” and “the Stranger” – see
Schutz (1964) Collected Papers vol. II, Part II.
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reality that arise in the virtual world of multiplayer online games. While
Schutz (of course) did not consider online games, our extension has several
precedents in his work.
In the first volume of his Structures of the Life-World, Schutz takes from
William James and Edmund Husserl the insight that what we regard as
“real,” in any given moment, depends upon a certain harmony and coher-
ence of experience. This is a core component in a phenomenological account
of experienced “worldness.”15 Schutz thus distinguishes a number of differ-
ent “finite provinces of meaning, upon which we could confer the accent of
reality” (Schutz & Luckmann, 1973, p.23). Each of these domains of cohesive
experience can be said to have the character of an enclosed world. Schutz
distinguishes several worlds from the most basic everyday life-world: “the
world of science,” “the world of religious experience,” fantasy worlds such as
the worlds of “daydreams, games, fairy tales, jokes, poetry” and also dream
worlds (ibid., pp.24-34). Schutz himself initially suggests that the everyday
life-world “may, with some emendation, be characterized as the ‘primary re-
ality”’ (Schutz & Luckmann, 1973, p.28ff.). What we are after is a pair of
clarifications: one regarding this notion of primacy, and another indicating
some necessary emendations.
Schutz sometimes treats the everyday life-world as “that province of real-
ity which the wide-awake and normal adult human simply takes for granted...
By this taken-for-grantedness, we designate everything which we experience
as [initially] unquestionable; every state of affairs is for us unproblematic
[only] until further notice” (Schutz & Luckmann, 1973, pp.3-4). We have in-
serted qualifiers here since they are necessary: while we do take for granted
many concrete states of affairs occurring within the life-world, each of them
is only unproblematic “until further notice.” Each can become problematic
and can be called into question. It is then up to us to pursue “explication,”
getting to know the situation better so as to restore the cohesiveness of ex-
perience and return to a (tentative) grasp of reality as unproblematic (until
further notice) (ibid., pp.8-16). What cannot ever be called into question is
the existence of the life-world as such, as the horizon of all such explication.
As Husserl puts it:
Everything which, as an existing object, is a goal of cognition
15A detailed examination of experienced worldness is beyond the scope of this paper.
Below we say a bit more, but we refer the interested reader to Husserl’s work, especially
Ideas II and the Crisis.
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[e.g., explication] is an existence on the ground of the world,
which is taken as existing as a matter of course... Cognition may
bring us to correct details in our opinions about existence, but
this means only that, instead of being thus and so, something
is otherwise – otherwise on the ground of the world existing in
totality. It is this universal ground of belief in a world which all
praxis presupposes, not only the praxis of life but also the theo-
retical praxis of cognition (Husserl, 1973, p.30; first two emphases
added; see also Husserl 1950, pp.48ff.).
It is this unquestionability of the everyday life-world as a totality that best-
captures its status as a “primary” reality from a phenomenological stand-
point. Many other claims made on behalf of the everyday life-world, we
suggest, are equally well applicable to the social worlds afforded by video
games. Thus, what we propose is to recognize a plurality of social life-worlds.
Consider, for example, some of Schutz’ other remarks regarding the everyday
life-world, to which we add enumerations:
The everyday life-world is [1] the region of reality in which man
can engage himself and which he can change while he operates
in it by means of his animate organism [seines Leibes ]. At the
same time, [2] the objectivities which are already found in this
realm (including the acts and the results of actions of other men)
limit his free possibilities of action. They place him up against
obstacles that can be surmounted, as well as barriers that are
insurmountable. Furthermore, [3] only within this realm can he
be understood by his fellow-men, and only in it can he work
together with them. Only in the world of everyday life can a
common, communicative, surrounding world be constituted. [4]
The world of everyday life is consequently man’s fundamental and
paramount reality (Schutz & Luckmann, 1973, p.1).
The term that has been translated as “animate organism” is Leib, which is
more typically translated in phenomenological texts as “lived Body.” One’s
lived Body, the zero-point of orientation, is not at all synonymous with one’s
physical flesh (cf. Husserl (1993, §§35-45 and §56, esp. subsection “h” –
compare Schutz 1973, p.37)). If we take players’ experiences of personal
“presence” seriously, we should allow that an in-game “avatar” can serve
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as a lived Body, and thus claim 1 remains true of the virtual worlds we
are discussing here. Taking co-presence and “worldness” seriously means
recognizing that claims 2 & 3 cannot suffice to (exclusively) characterize the
everyday life-world, since there are social online gameworlds in which the
same claims are true: the “only” in Schutz’ claim 3 must be dropped. As a
result, we maintain that the “consequently” in Schutz’ claim 4 is a bit too
quick. If something like claim 4 really does follow as a consequence from
1-3, then it follows for gameworlds as well: a world with which one engages,
and which affords and constrains actions alongside others, is a fundamental
reality, i.e., a life-world – perhaps one among many.16
The everyday life-world is, as Schutz says, a primary or paramount reality
in a unique sense, but its primacy is best understood through its status as
in-principle unquestionable. This is not quite true of video gameworlds.
When one steps into the “magic circle” and is living in a gameworld, that
gameworld does constitute the taken-for-granted ground of all one’s in-game
praxis.17 So long as one remains in this mode of experience, and the varieties
of in-game “presence” are sustained, the everyday life-world is bracketed,
and the accent of unquestioned reality is conferred upon the gameworld.
States of affairs within the gameworld can be called into question, but so
long as one lives in it, the totality of the gameworld, as the horizon of all
“explication,” cannot itself be called into question. However, when we cease
to live into gameworlds, and return to the everyday life-world, we attain
a perspective from which the totality of the gameworld can be called into
question: gameworlds are, of course, typically not regarded as “real.”18
Even here, there are important precedents and clarifications in Schutz’
work. Despite his focus on the everyday life-world, Schutz remarks that for
as long as we take up an attitude which engrosses us in a particular world
16We think the applicability of claims 1-4 makes it acceptable to speak of multiple
life-worlds. If one reserves the term “life-world” for the everyday life-world, one will still
need to recognize a plurality of lived social worlds.
17The everyday life-world is the taken-for-granted ground of everyday activities like
“playing a video game,” however it cannot be understood as the ground of all in-game
praxis. For example, many games involve “fantastic” practices like casting magical spells
– none of the taken-for-granted existences of the everyday life-world can support this kind
of praxis, and the praxis is not engaged with existences in the everyday life-world.
18The cessation of living-into a gameworld can be voluntary (e.g., one might cease in-
game activity to examine the graphical details and contemplate the skill of the game’s
designers) or involuntary (e.g., due to an in-game glitch or lag, or a disruption from the
everyday life-world, such as an errant cat appearing in front of your monitor).
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(province of meaning) that world becomes real to us (ibid., p.24-25). Further,
his conception of freely-imagined fantasy worlds recognizes the possibility of
socially shared artificial worlds (ibid., p.32). This possibility is in fact already
licensed by Schutz’ core claims regarding how face-to-face* relationships nor-
mally afford us access to what we know is the shared everyday life-world:
we know we are in “the same undivided common environment [Umgebung ]”
when we can “point to [hinzweisen]” some object in it and coordinate our
experiences to it (Schutz, 1967, pp.170-171). There is no strict requirement
that either what we point to, or our shared environment as a whole, must
be located in everyday space. And in volume II of The Structures of the
Life-world, Schutz notes that, strictly speaking, our na¨ıve experience of the
everyday life-world does not present it to us as the only reality:
...only when this reality character is set as absolute by a theory of
reality that blindly denies the claim to reality of other provinces
of meaning, does the dream (and other non-everyday provinces)
appear unreal... Theories of reality of this kind form, as is known,
the core of the more or less rationalist worldviews predominant in
modern societies. They reshape the natural attitude of members
of this society... completely different theories have shaped the
worldview of other societies... In the historical reshapings of the
natural attitude in these societies, in the common sense that is
“sound” there, dream-reality may be equal or superior to, or even
“more real than,” everyday reality (Schutz & Luckmann, 1989,
pp.120-121).
Elsewhere Schutz (1957) discusses how the province of meaning of a social
world is created by those within it. A group develops its own social world by
interpreting itself as a social body, constructing and even institutionalizing
shared standards of rationalization. It is these implicitly shared conceptions
of what is “rational” for an agent which create the orderliness and harmony of
interpersonal experience which results in a stable social world. A group may
gain some degree of reflective awareness of its everyday methods and activities
of “rationalization and institutionalization” as these change throughout the
group’s history, but a group typically does not reflectively understand these
activities as constituting a world, despite their doing so (ibid., p.245).19 The
same, we suggest, can occur in gameworlds.
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In short, once we take experienced “presence” seriously, the permeability
of the magic circle becomes, phenomenologically, grounds for recognizing a
plurality of life-worlds. We have argued that this account of the experienced
worldness of gameworlds is consonant with Schutz’ own approach.20 To cast
our proposal in terms of prior GS, what we propose is tantamount to re-
ceonceiving “the magic circle.” If it is possible to live into and co-produce a
virtual world with a similar degree of reality as the everyday-life world, the
rigid distinction between our “daily lives” and the playground of the magic
circle becomes not only permeable (as GS has shown) but (this is our point)
which world one lives in becomes a matter of which province of meaning one
is participating in at any given moment. We turn now to address more fully
how the Schutzian framework accommodates the remaining foci of previous
GS.
3.2 Clarification & Application
If we make the proposed extension of Schutz’ account, we endorse a multi-
plicity of lived social worlds: the one everyday life-world, and many virtual
life-worlds all with equal potential for experienced “reality.” This is distinct
from the position Ollinaho (2018) recently takes in his application of Schutz
to understanding how virtual worlds are becoming woven into the everyday
life-world. He says that through virtualization, “another zone of primary
relevance other than that of ‘here and now’ has been erected and has become
a part of the life-world of normal persons engaged in the world of daily life”
(ibid., p.4, our emph.). Unlike Ollinaho, we seek to preserve players’ expe-
rience of the distinct nature of gameworlds, rather than treating them as
new annexes of the everyday life-world; and unlike Ollinaho, we propose to
pluralize the concept of the life-world to accommodate this.21 We turn now
20We admit that Schutz himself may often seem to work under the assumption that
corporeality is essential to the (everyday) life-world, and that corporeal proximity with
Others is required for face-to-face* interactions. however, we maintain that when Schutz
stresses the important of experiences of the “live corporeality [Leiblichkeit ]” of oneself
(e.g., 1973, pp. 32, 37, 43, 93) and of the Other (e.g., 1973, pp. 62, 254), what is centrally
under discussion are lived Bodies as experienced fields of expression and origins of action.
This is especially clear when the speaks of “perceptions of [one’s] own animate organism
[Leibes]” during dreaming – cf. 1973, p.32).
21We agree with Ollinaho that virtual worlds “gear into” the everyday life-world, and
influence its relevance structures. But we would resist his gambit to uphold the primacy
of the everyday life-world by claiming (a) that virtual worlds are merely symbolic, and
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to address more fully how our Schutzian framework accommodates the foci
of previous GS, discussing them in what we hope is a perspicuous order.
Co-presence : Taking co-presence seriously requires permitting the pos-
sibility of face-to-face* encounters in virtual worlds. Schutz supposed that
in a face-to-face* encounter between consociates, they must experience both
spatial immediacy and temporal simultaneity. We focus here on the spa-
tial. Schutz’s description of what constitutes spatial immediacy is not com-
monsense bodily proximity in everyday space. All that is required is that
another’s “lived Body is present to me in its fullness of indications as a
field of expression [mir sein Leib in seiner Somptomfu¨lles als Ausdrucksfeld
vorgegeben ist ]” for their subjective experiences (1967, p.163, our emph.,
translation corrected). This does not set forth a requirement that one has
particular sensory experiences of the other (e.g., of their fleshly body), or
that one has an ability to acquire detailed knowledge of his or her consoci-
ate’s subjective experience. All that is required is that through the fullness
of concrete indications of our consciousness, we are able to have a “gen-
eral correspondence” of each other’s experiences (ibid., p.165), and that two
consociates can “grow older together” as their subjective experiences unfold
in unison.
Schutz himself, focusing upon the social reality of the everyday life-world,
often seemed to work within the assumption that a face-to-face* relation
involves proximity between fleshly bodies. However, as discussed above, we
regard this assumption as unnecessary to his account, and we propose to
explicitly abandon it. This assumption is upheld by some scholars, who hold
that a face-to-face* interaction is impossible in a virtual world in virtue of
some priority given to flesh bodies (see Turkle 2012). This not only precludes
a nuanced approach to a study of virtual worlds, but imposes an unsupported
a priori determination of what constitutes legitimate sociality. We suggest
that from a phenomenological perspective, the corporeality or virtuality of
bodies should be considered irrelevant to the question of whether one can
stand in a face-to-face* relationship. It is compatible with Schutz’ basic
phenomenological account that a virtual body, such as an in-game avatar,
can serve as the expressive field which enables us to experience each other’s
(b) that from a scientific-theoretical perspective, virtual life-worlds are ontologically de-
pendent upon the physical structure of the everyday life-world (Ollinaho, 2018, p.199).
To us, claim (a) is phenomenologically disingenuous, and claim (b) is orthogonal to the
phenomenological question of primacy.
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subjectivity, and can thus enable face-to-face* interaction.22 To be in a
world is to be in its space, and to be in that world with others is to be there
with them -– to grow older with them there, in the shared immediacy of
expression. Where one’s flesh is located in everyday space is of no essential
consequence for this basic phenomenological analysis. In short, we can take
players’ experience of co-presence seriously, and countenance their face-to-
face* interactions, by extending Schutz’ view.
We offer an illustration. Steam is a game distribution platform that pro-
vides access to a large library of games. Meadow is a multiplayer online
game that affords great possibilities of rich social interaction. Its developers
call it “a forum in games clothing.” In this game, players are embodied as
animals and can engage in a variety of behaviors (e..g, vocalizing minimally,
jumping, sitting, sleeping). Direct text-based communication or spoken com-
munication between players is not possible, but there is a symbolic system of
communication, in which players can make static, pictorial “emotes” appear
in little speech bubbles above their heads. Players can choose to communicate
via pictures of their animal, (e.g., an image of their animal waving, laugh-
ing, crying, etc.), symbols, (e.g. a forward arrow, an ‘X’, a question mark,
a checkmark, etc.), or symbols that refer to objects within the gameworld
(e.g., a tree, water, mountains, a group of animals, obelisks, etc.). Addi-
tionally, players can combine any two of these symbols together. Through
using these symbols as well as embodied gestures, players can communicate
with each other where to go in the gameworld and what to do (e.g., crack
open “obelisks” together to gain points, collect flowers, or just play in some
mud). For example, one can combine the mountain symbol with a question
mark which other players interpret as, “Shall we go to the mountains?” or
“Mountains next?”
Players report feeling deeply connected with other players throughout the
course of a play session. One player, Nuvi, reflected that one of the biggest
joys of the game was “when you end up a co-captain of a little crew of
animals, feeling some unspeakable bond with the quiet bunny that is always
at your side waiting for everyone else to catch up.”23 Additionally, there is
an entire thread in Meadow’s Steam community where players thank other
players (or to try to find players) with whom they interacted. NinjaGerbil
wrote a note recently,
22We recognize that, as of now, virtual bodies typically afford less expressiveness.
23Public review on Steam of Meadow by Nuvi at 3:10pm, February 11, 2018.
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To a certain badger on Europe server, Grove 1: thank you for
brightening my day!... you were friendly and we often found
ourselves making the same jokes and both highlighting collectibles
with snow at the same time. You also have a very good eye; and
you pointed out so many collectibles that the group would have
missed otherwise–how on earth you were the only one to spot that
giant fabled mushroom that literally went over our heads, I don’t
know [confused swan emoji] You stuck with me through all the
people that joined and left our group, and I was really touched
that you supported me when I was leading the group, even when a
few particular goats would not slow down for the others... [angry
frog emoji]...I certainly will not forget you! [love-struck badger
emoji].
Public comment on “Player Thanks Thread” in Meadow discus-
sion forum on Steam, posted at 1:39pm on February 15, 2018.
In both these instances, NinjaGerbil and Nuvi report feeling bonded with
other players, despite not being in the fleshly presence of another human.
Nuvi grew older with the rabbit in a face-to-face* relationship while waiting
for other animals to catch up to them. NinjaGerbil clearly learned about the
badger player, reporting that they made jokes and shared attention. The fact
that both players felt compelled to post about their experiences which in-
cluded their feelings of “We-ness” (joining, at the time, almost four thousand
other players who also posted on this thread), speaks to the richness of their
interaction with others – despite the lack of everyday verbal communication,
and the lack of human-like (virtual) embodiment.
Worldness : We’ve discussed how in Schutz’ account, group-identities
can function to support rationalizations and institutionalizations that delin-
eate distinct social worlds. Once we extend Schutz’ account to recognize a
plurality of life-worlds, and once we recognize that everyday spatial proximity
is not required for face-to-face* interactions, it follows that group-identities
can similarly function in virtual worlds to constitute new social worlds in
them. Pearce & Artemesia’s (2008) discussion of experienced in-game eth-
nicities offers one clear example: there the institutionalization of the social
world was explicit as the Uruvians, fearing extinction as their homeworld
was shut down, established enclaves and cultural education centers in other
virtual worlds as a way of maintaining their identity and ethnicity.
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In the everyday life-world, there are many such social worlds, all of which
occur in a single shared physical space. The case is not importantly different
with gameworlds. As part of the experience which defines it as a world, each
virtual world typically has its own spatiality: what is often called its physics,
and which in video games is “simulated” by a physics engine. The spatiality
of a virtual world often appears in a mode not dissimilar to everyday space.
It is a short walk from “here,” in the everyday life-world, to a nearby shop;
it may just as well be a “short walk” — effected by a mouse-click -– to a
nearby shop within “Runeterra,” the world of the game League of Legends.
Despite this similarity of experienced meaning, the two worlds stand apart:
there is no way for one to walk from the everyday life-world to any virtual
gameworld. This reflects the (to some extent) self-enclosed character of each
virtual world. However, within this space, there exist locales which are valued
according to specific, shared “finite provinces of meaning” which constitute
social worlds. For example, in Star Wars: The Old Republic, the players in
different factions assign different social values to the same locale in game-
space, according to their group identity and shared aims. In the case of
players aligned with the Republic, the Empire’s capital world of Dromund
Kaas is inaccessible enemy territory, whereas for Empire-aligned players, it
is home.
The Schutzian framework also enables analyses of titles that have multi-
ple worlds within them. For example, in the (not entirely accurately titled)
World of Warcraft, there are in fact multiple copies of the over-all gameworld,
with each copy called a “realm.”24 Normally, players cannot communicate
with other players who are in different realms, even if they are both in iden-
tical copies of “the same” forest. However, there are special areas called
“Cross-Realm Zones” (CRZs). CRZs are jointly accessible to players in dif-
ferent realms, and allow them to see and interact with each other. CRZs are
often in-game cities or areas that require players to form a cooperative group
in order to complete a particular task. When a player leaves a CRZ, other
players will see them vanish and will no longer be able to communicate with
24One motivation for realms is that MMOs like World of Warcraft face a difficulty
due to limited in-game resources. For instance, a player might pursue a quest to thin a
population of “Springpaw” lynxes in a relatively small area; however, if dozens of players
are also pursuing this same quest, a player might have to wait awhile for enough Springpaw
lynxes to appear for them to kill. This could cause boredom, frustration, or anger at other
players. The game designers circumvent this by having many instances of “the same” area
(and thus, many places a player can go to complete the quest), in different realms.
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them. While a player may know that a player who has left the CRZ is still
(elsewhere) in-game, they are no longer in the same gameworld.
Cases like this result in an increase in the complexity of social relations
in and between worlds. The extended Schutzian framework enables us to
address this complexity by distinguishing between (i) everyday, (ii) intra-
ludic, and (iii) trans-ludic variants of the social relationships which Schutz
himself so aptly distinguished only in the everyday life-world. We illustrate
this novel complexity of social relations in Figure 2 below. A CRZ in World
of Warcraft essentially allows players to quickly cross the boundary between
trans-ludic contemporary and intra-ludic consociate.
When we live in the everyday life-world, all the others with whom we are
in direct social commerce are in that world with us (see again Fig.1). Like-
wise, when we live into a virtual world, we find with us intra-ludic, “virtually”
present predecessors, successors, contemporaries, and consociates. Some of
these others are Non-Playable Characters (NPCs) who have no human sub-
ject controlling them. But most are controlled by users who are similarly
living into the same virtual world. Since there is a multiplicity of game-
worlds, it is constantly the case that whichever world one lives into, there
are further subjects who are one’s mere contemporaries, living in another life-
world. For example, you, the reader, are currently not living with anyone in
Runeterra, nor vice versa.25 Likewise, those in Runeterra are not living with
players in any realm of Azeroth (the titular World of Warcraft).
Despite that, we in the everyday life-world do have a kind of social re-
lationship to the subjects currently living in virtual worlds: they are our
trans-ludic contemporaries. They are potential consociates: we could live
with them in a face-to-face encounter, if either we join them in their current
life-world, or they return to ours. Doing so is a bit more mediated than
simply walking up to a stranger on the street, but the living social relation
we establish, and the transition from being mere contemporaries to being
consociates, is fundamentally the same from a phenomenological standpoint.
25It is perhaps worth asking where you, the reader, are living in this moment. If one
were to extend our argument to worlds beyond that of MMOs, it could be said that you
are living into this paper as a finite province of meaning. Depending on how immersed you
are, it may be that you are experiencing yourself as standing in relation to us, the authors,
as your predecessors who have both physically and conceptually moved around this space
before you. For our part at time of writing we relate to you as a successor – someone
we have imagined and contemplated extensively, but someone of whose uniqueness and
specificity we are unaware.
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Distinguishing trans-ludic and intra-ludic varieties of social relation is not
only useful for understanding social relationships between subjects in the ev-
eryday life-world and virtual gameworlds, it is also useful for understanding
social relations between subjects in different gameworlds. Currently, it is
Figure 2: Schematic of the extended Schutzian framework. Each panel rep-
resents a world in the same manner as Fig. 1 above (the everyday life-world
at bottom left, a virtual world in the center, and another virtual word at
top right). All three subjects shown in the mundane world are living into
a virtual world (indicated by dashed lines for stick figures in the mundane
world, and the arrows running between panels). Within each virtual world,
all of Schutz’ spheres of social reality are replicated. All this occurs simulta-
neously in the time of the mundane world (note the single grey line running
through all panels) yet each world also has its own “native” past, present,
and future, in addition to its native space.
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common for a user to be confronted directly with the multiplicity of social
worlds that games support. It is possible for two users to be “friends” on
the Steam distribution platform. By default, anytime a user is in-game and
a friend begins playing another title, the user receives a notification (in the
form of a pop-up at the bottom of their screen) indicating which game their
friend has begun playing (whether it is a multiplayer game, or not). When a
user sees this notification, they are made aware that their friend is currently a
trans-ludic contemporary, and they are told which gameworld their friend is
in. This is illustrated in Figure 3 below: a screenshot depicting actual game-
play of a multiplayer online game, Tribes:Ascend. There are several game
modes in Tribes, but a squad-based “capture the flag” mechanic is popular.
In Fig. 3, the character shown at right is, we would argue, an intra-ludic
consociate. We admit that possibilities for interpersonal expression in Tribes
are quite limited: there are no canonical gestures, no facial expressions, and
in-game chat is limited to deploying a fixed list of catch-phrases plus voice-
overs (e.g., “Retrieve our flag!”). Still, in actual gameplay, teammates often
work together in close (virtual) proximity, and an emergent (virtual) body
language indicates player intentions.
In Fig.3, the consociate shown at right is a bit hesitant to engage the
opposing team, and this hesitance was expressed through the position (near
home base) and movement of the avatar (or rather, the lack of movement
to engage the opposing team). While this face-to-face* interaction was oc-
curring, a pop-up at the bottom-right in Fig.3 showed that a friend had
begun living in a different gameworld. Knowing which worlds their friends
are currently living in, a player can consider whether they prefer to remain
they-oriented to them, or whether they would instead pursue a face-to-face*
relationship by joining them in another world. The Schutzian framework
provides, in advance, a basic understanding of all such social relationships.
And there are many such cases: even limiting ourselves to the genre of mul-
tiplayer FPS titles, there are over 500 titles on Steam, each of which affords
precisely the kinds of relationships described here.
From this perspective, it becomes imperative to pursue not only a “static”
analysis of some instance of a player living into a gameworld, but also to
consider the “dynamics” of how players switch between everyday and virtual
social spheres, and how their social relations rapidly shift. The player’s
virtual embodiment becomes one target of particular interest. Although
Taylor and others are correct to emphasize that being digitally embodied is
vital for presence, we can no longer treat it as an “all or nothing” experience.
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On this phenomenological approach it becomes an open and complex question
to determine how, at a moment, a player experiences themselves as living into
a virtual body, and to what degree (see Hardesty 2016).
Identity and the Magic Circle : In traditional Game Studies, the per-
meability of the magic circle has been linked to a multiplicity of identity. We
have re-described the permeability of the magic circle phenomenologically as
Figure 3: A screenshot from Tribes: Ascend showing others in a virtual
social world and simultaneously the activity of a trans-ludic contemporary.
The shot is from the player’s in-game point of view. An intra-ludic consociate
(teammate) is shown to the right. Intra-ludic contemporaries are shown in
the distance (in the water under the ship – they are marked with red and blue
arrows). In the bottom-right corner, a pop-up indicates (with a high degree
of anonymity) the activities of a trans-ludic contemporary in another virtual
world. (Thanks to Hi-Rez Studios and Valve Corporation for permissions).
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a multiplicity of life-worlds. It follows naturally from our account that one’s
identity will take on a multiplicity of new aspects as the number of worlds
which one could live into is multiplied. If one does live into any virtual world,
one will identify (or be identified by others), at least in part, as a denizen of
it, in addition to being a denizen of the everyday life-world. Even if one does
not herself choose, or have the opportunity, to live into any virtual life-worlds,
this also affects identity as it is perceived by others: a person who lives only
in one life-world might be compared to a person who never leaves their home-
town. Insofar as one’s experienced identity or “presence” is conditioned in
any way by place or by social sphere, the multiplicity of lived social worlds
will necessarily result in a multiplicity of identity. Put another way, the possi-
bility of genuine, face-to-face* interactions in and across open worlds, real or
virtual, is what enables and reveals multiplicities of identity. Our Schutzian
framework thus neatly links several major loci of research in previous GS.
Incidentally, the distinction between how insiders and outsiders understand
what it means to be a “denizen” of a world can neatly explain, e.g., Turkle’s
observation that our experience of others changes as they spend more time
living outside the everyday life-world. Turkle’s observation ultimately brings
to light the unique social relation we stand in to trans-ludic contemporaries.
We can do justice to this phenomenological observation without endorsing
Turkle’s evaluations against this social relation.
Varieties of Presence : To begin to sum up, on a Schutzian approach,
the three broad varieties of presence (outlined above in ‘Brief Survey of Game
Studies Research”) are treated as not exclusionary, or even richly contrast-
ing, but rather intimately co-constitutive. As we have discussed, Pearce &
Artemesia (2008) provide detailed empirical support for this claim in their
account of “fictive” ethnicity in virtual worlds. We do not wish to mini-
mize their contribution, but what we stress is that, in the Schutzian frame-
work, this follows for both virtual worlds and the everyday life-world as a
matter of course: on this phenomenological account, we should expect such
co-constitution between varieties of presence in virtual worlds. Co-presence
naturally finds a place in Schutz’ phenomenological account of social relations
(specifically in the descriptions of they-orientation and thou-orientation).
These basic descriptions of varieties of co-presence are broad enough to be
adopted by any of the accounts reviewed above (e.g., Taylor’s reading in
terms of embodiment and social visibility, or Pearce & Artemisia’s social
constructivist account). Once we have taken the step to recognize a plu-
rality of social life-worlds, Pearce & Artemesia’s emphasis on the socially
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co-constructed character of identity-as-place, and the interactions between
co-presence and environmental presence, is readily accommodated at the
ground floor of our extended Schutzian account: these life-worlds are under-
stood as the most basic places in which a subject can dwell among others as
denizen. The physics of virtual worlds is no small part of their experienced
worldness and their environmental presence, but the co-presence of others in
a shared social, virtual world is also constitutive of its worldness, constituting
it as a shared (and thus somewhat “objective”) location. And with social-
ity comes significant changes in one’s identity, altering experienced personal
presence. Thus the plurality of life-worlds readily accounts for the possibility
of a multiplicity of identities. In this way personal presence, co-presence,
and environmental presence are readily understood in advance as generally
co-determined in our extended Schutzian account.
Likewise, a Schutzian account anticipates Pearce and Artemesia’s find-
ing that changes to individual and social identity can affect corresponding
changes in a world’s environmental presence: e.g., a virtual world came to
be experienced as a lost homeworld for the Uruvian subjects that Pearce
and Artemesia investigate. A Schutzian social world, like individuals’ iden-
tities and activities, is co-constituted through interactions with others: as
a shared, “finite province of meaning” is enacted, everyday behaviors be-
come socially sanctioned and expected, and familiar places become laden
with shared meanings as sites that solicit appropriate actions. In this way,
the world itself achieves an embodied social presence. In the loss of such a
world, denizens will be unable to carry out behaviors in their appropriate
place, and thus will be unable to be the individual they experience them-
selves to be. One would expect of a profound reaction of the sort Pearce &
Artemesia observe.
4 Concluding Remarks
We conclude by outlining what we see as the major strengths of the Schutzian
framework, and sketching how it can facilitate future inquiry into life in
virtual life-worlds.
One great strength we see in the extended Schutzian framework lies in
how well it coheres with, and unifies, previous insights regarding how users
live into virtual gameworlds. The foregoing illustrates how the main themes
of prior research into virtual worlds each find their natural place within the
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Schutzian framework, and thereby emerge as complementary avenues of in-
quiry in a unified research agenda. Importantly, our phenomenological ac-
count aims only to provide a preliminary description of the phenomena of
social life in virtual gameworlds. Thus, it does not prejudge for or against
anyone’s favored theoretical analysis of these phenomena. Likewise it does
not prejudge for or against anyone’s favored ethical or critical evaluations
of these phenomena. It thus helps to clarify the common ground that all
researchers in GS can share, as a preliminary step before undertaking these
important avenues of inquiry.
Another strength lies in the fact that the Schutzian framework succeeds
in providing us with basic distinctions we need to make sense of what is now
becoming standard practice in virtual life. Early work (e.g., Taylor 1999,
2002) studied virtual worlds which were relatively isolated (not only from
each other, but also from the everyday life-world). But as Pearce & Arteme-
sia (2008) have pointed out, and as we have stressed above, the boundaries
between worlds (both real and virtual) have been recognized to be increas-
ingly permeable. Henceforth, any adequate description of the phenomena of
virtual life will require some conception of what we have called intra-ludic
and trans-ludic varieties of social relation. Our extended Schutzian account
readily provides these much-needed resources, illustrating their utility in the
case of video gameworlds.
The greatest strength of the Schutzian framework, however, lies in the
fact that it provides a basic understanding of users’ experiences in and across
virtual worlds which is rooted in no more than is already required for under-
standing our social experiences in the everyday life-world. As shown above,
we need only slightly weaken one common assumption regarding Schutz’
account: in particular, the assumption that everyday spatial proximity is re-
quired for face-to-face* interactions. As we sought to show through textual
evidence, this commonsense interpretation of a “face-to-face” encounter is
not in fact an essential component in Schutz’ social phenomenology. Once
we drop it, we can readily apply his descriptive framework to virtual worlds.
The alien territory of virtual worlds is then readily understood via an exten-
sion of a basic phenomenological understanding of the everyday life-world. It
is thus possible to systematically approach and validate players’ experiences
of having intimate and meaningful social interactions and relationships with
other players in gameworlds.
Finally, the extension of the Schutzian framework has profound phe-
nomenological implications. In Husserl’s conception, it is crucial that “the
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life-world does have, in all its [subject-] relative features, a general structure”
which is essentially shared in everyone’s experience, and which constitutes
a constantly shared, “universal life-world a priori” (Husserl, 1970, p.139,
original emph.). Most fundamentally, this universal structure is summa-
rized: “thing and world on the one side, thing-consciousness on the other”
(ibid., §37 ), and it is supposed that all our praxis takes place on the presup-
posed ground of one world which is continuously and communally constituted
through this structure. If we recognize the plurality of life-worlds, we see that
while this universal structure does characterize each life-world, it does not
suffice to integrate all our praxis onto a single unifying ground of one shared
world. This raises a set of interesting questions about the boundaries and
transcendencies of the everyday life-world (Schutz & Luckmann, 1989, pp.99-
130). Phenomenologists have not seriously considered the possibility that in
our experiences of the everyday life-world, we could encounter a boundary on
whose other side lies another life-world that we could inhabit. Phenomenol-
ogy has analyzed only one of many life-worlds. Virtual worlds can, and ought
to, be studied in pursuit of phenomenology’s aim of providing an ultimate
clarification of the constitution of the life-world(s).
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